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HAZARDOUS ENTERPRISES AND RISK BEARING CAPACITY*
CLARENCE MORRISt
THIS little article deals with what the pedants call "liability for an escaping
inanimate destructive force." It is divided into two parts: a sketch of the
doctrinal history, and a critical glance at policies underlying present doctrines
in the light of some observations on risk bearing capacity.
Doctrinal Development
In the early English common law there was much support for the proposi-
tion that an actor was responsible, without proof of fault, for harm done by
his activity.' By the Eighteenth Century, however, English law had changed
for most injuries other than defamation and some kinds of damage to real
property. Fault had become a prerequisite to liability for personal injury and
for damage to personal property.
In mid-Nineteenth Century the important case of Rylands v. Flctcher'-
was decided. A mill owner ordered construction of a dam to get water power.
The resulting reservoir lay over ancient abandoned coal mines. The mill
owner had no reason to suspect that these old diggings led into an operating
colliery,, but they did. When the dam was closed, water ran down the old shafts,
seeping into and flooding the colliery. The case had an extended history and
many opinions were written as it went through the English courts. Ultimately
the mill owner was held liable. Two of the opinions are more frequently
quoted than the others:
In the Court of Exchequer Chamber Mr. Justice Blackburn said, "[T]he
true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril. . . ."3 This view of strict liability was not surpris-
ing in a jurisdiction in which courts were committed to the proposition that
*This article is an adapted excerpt from a student text on Torts which the writer
is preparing.
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1. In the famous case of the Thorns, Y.B. 6 Ed. IV, f. 7, pl. 18 (1466), the court
said: "[T]hough a man doth a lawful thing, yet if any damage do thereby befall another,
he shall answer for it, if he could have avoided it." The words "could have avoided it"
do not mean "would have avoided it by use of due care," for the court held the defendant
liable without fault for accidentally dropping hedge clippings on a neighbor's land. The
court expressed similar ideas on other types of accidental injury, including unintended
non-negligent personal injuries.
2. 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd,
L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
3. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866).
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unauthorized entries on land entailed liability without fault in trespass actions.
But Blackburn's language was broad enough to cover liability for damages to
personal property and injuries to life and limb-even in cases where the
harm occurs without an entry on the claimant's real property.
In the House of Lords, Lord Cairns wrote the most influential opinion.4
He substantially agreed with Blackburn but restricted the rule of liability-with-
out-fault to "non-natural users." He then classified the mill owner's use as
non-natural and voted for liability. By "non-natural user" Cairns probably
did not mean "artificial user." But he did not define the term. Perhaps he
intended to distinguish between traditional use and novel use.
Some American courts purport to follow Rylands v. Flctcher, often applying
Blackburn's statement of the rule." Many other American courts have at-
tempted total rejection of the Rylands holding. One of the early leading cases
was Marshall v. W~elwood and Garside,7 a suit for property damages resulting
from a bursting steam boiler. The trial judge charged the jury that the
boiler-owner could be found liable without proof of fault. The appellate court
viewed Rylands v. Fletcher as an anomaly in a law of torts in which most
liabilities depend on fault. Comparing the case before it to a traffic accident
the court said,
"[I]f traffic cannot be carried on without some risk, why can it not
be said with the same truth, that other affairs of life, though they be
transacted away from highways, cannot be carried on without some risk;
and if such risk is, in the one case, to be borne by innocent persons,
why not in the other ?"
But the idea that enterprisers should pay for all damages resulting from
their undertaking has strong appeal, especially when even careful prosecu-
4. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 337-40 (1,63).
5. The English courts developed another important limitation by holding that legis-
lative permission to conduct an activity has the same effect as "natural user." In North-
western Util., Ltd. v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., [1936] A.C. 103 (P.C. 1935), the
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was held inapplicable to a utility company whose gas escaped
into a basement and exploded-because the company located and used its pipes in accord-
ance with statutory permission.
6. His recognition of act of God as a defense has also been followed. In a Minnesota
case a city whose storm sewers overflowed in an unprecedented rain storm escaped liabil-
ity on this ground. Power v. City of Hibbing, 182 Minn. 66, 233 N.V. 597 (1930).
Cairns' limitation to non-natural user has been honored from time to time. In McCord
Rubber Co. v. St. Joseph Water Co., 181 Mo. 678, 81 S.W. 189 (1904), an action for
damage to goods in a cellar resulting from bursting water mains through which a water
company supplied its customers, the court held that the water was "brought in by the
method universally in use in cities and is not to be treated as an unnatural gathering of a
dangerous agent." Id. at 695, 81 S.V. at 193 (1904).
7. 38 N.J.L 339 (1876).
S. Id. at 345. Other well-known sweeping repudiations of Rylands v. Fletcher are
Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1876) ; Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 123 Te. 155, 96
S.W.2d 221 (1936).
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tion of an enterprise conducted for profit is freighted with risk. This appeal
is heightened when the enterprise is novel.
Sometimes courts discuss the problem of enterprise liability in terms of a
special type of activity. Blasting is a good example. Some American courts
hold a blaster liable for proximately consequent harms to persons and property
without proof of fault and even though use of explosives in performing an
important service is necessary and justifiable.0 Other specific kinds of enter-
prise have received legislative attention. For example, the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act, adopted in several states, provides that the operator of falling
aircraft is responsible for resulting damage without proof of fault.
The focus on blasting and falling aircraft in current opinions is, of course,
much narrower than the judicial focus in Rylands v. Fletcher. Black-
burn and Cairns tried to generalize on all cases in which gathered substances
escape and do damage. Some courts have taken a position somewhere between
these two extremes; their focus has *been on extra-hazardous activities. In
Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co., 10 a contractor stored dynamite at
the site of a large construction job; it exploded, damaged a nearby house, and
injured the householder. The court said that blasting had been singled out
as a type of activity entailing liability without fault, and that there was no
reason to distinguish between (1) intentional blasting explosions and (2)
accidental explosions of dynamite stored where it could do harm. Then the
court generalized still further:
"When a person engages in such a dangerous activity, useful though
it may be, he becomes an insurer.
"... When, as here, the defendant, though without fault, has engaged
in the perilous activity of storing large quantities of a dangerous explosive
for use in his business, we think there is no justification for relieving it of
liability, and that the owner of the business, rather than a third person
who has no relation to the explosion, other than of injury, should bear
the loss.'' 1
Using this rationale, other courts have visited liability without proof of fault
on enterprises engaged in a wide variety of ultra-hazardous activities.12
9. See, e.g., Federoff v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1950).
Other courts refuse to distinguish between blasting and less hazardous enterprises and
hold a blaster is not liable for any type of harm unless blasting was unjustifiable or im-
properly done. See, e.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949). Still other courts have worked out an intermediate position by use of a
trespass q.c.f. analysis; if a blast throws damaging rocks or debris on adjoining property
the blast is denominated an unauthorized entry and the blaster is held liable, but if the
damages are done merely by concussion or vibration they are not held sufficiently "direct"
to constitute a trespass, and therefore the blaster is not liable unless his fault is established.
See, e.g., Booth v. Rome, W. & O.T.R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893).
10. 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
11. Id. at 514.
12. In Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928), an oil
producer's careful drilling nevertheless resulted in a "blow out" which threw oil, mud,
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Policy Analysis of Enterprise Liability Without Fatlt
Long before Rylands v. Fletchcr the trespass rule of strict liability for un-
authorized entries had been enshrined as good English common law. When
Rylands was tried in Exchequer, Bramwell, B. termed the flow of water into
the mine a trespassory entry. Martin, B. was unwilling to accede; he said
that the mine damage was "too consequential" to constitute a trespass. For
over a century and a half English tort law had been moving away from strict
liability for acts and while Martin did not repudiate the unauthorized entry
rule, he showed a distinct distaste for liability without fault.13 The Chief
Baron, Pollock, voted with Martin, and the miner's claim was disallowed at
trial. Martin's views were surely known to the judges in Exchequer Chain-
ber and the House of Lords when they held the mill operator liable. It seems
most unlikely that all of the appellate judges were concerned only with tech-
nical aspects of trespass doctrine. What considerations did lead to the rejec-
tion of Martin's views?
It has been suggested that most of the judges were recruited from the
gentry, a class which frowned on the industrial invasion of the stately English
countryside. Mills were no longer picturesque grinders of home-grown grain
for kitchen-baked bread; they were unsightly, ungainly, "non-natural" textile
factories run by men "in trade." They should at least pay their way-which
included paying for damage done to neighbors. Even though such a policy
might result in one industrialist paying off another (as it did in Rylands v.
Fletcher), it would also shield rural souls who found themselves near burgeon-
ing industry.
American judges of the Nineteenth Century were of a different breed. Many
were politicians; all were living in a new land crying for exploitation; indus-
sand, and rocks on nearby property. The court held the producer liable on the ground
that he acted with knowledge that injury might result to his neighbor. More recently, in
Luthringer v. 'Moore, 80 A. Cal. App. 123, 181 P.2d 89 (3d Dist. 1947), aff'd. 31 Cal. 2d
489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948), an exterminator used hydrocyanic gas to rid a restaurant #f
cockroaches and poisoned a workman in an adjoining store. The trial judge charged the
jury that the exterminator was liable without proof of fault. The appellate courts affirmed
on the ground that the enterprise was ultra-hazardous, and therefore the enterpriser was
liable for foreseeable injuries proximately resulting from reasonably careful prosecution
of the enterprise. Said the Court of Appeals, "[T]he dangerous enterprise must 'pay its
way' and the tendency of the courts is to impose liability for resulting injuries which are
foreseeable within the risk created." Luthringer v. Moore, 80 A. Cal. App. 123, 132, 181
P.2d 89, 96 (3d Dist. 1947). The Supreme Court agreed.
13. He said, "To hold the defendants liable would... make them insurers against
the consequence of a lawful act upon their own land when they had no reason to believe
or suspect that any damage was likely to ensue.
"... [T]here is no better established rule of law than that when damage is done to
personal property, and even to the person, by collision either upon the road or at sea,
there must be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally respbnsible.
... I can see no reason why damage to real property shuuld be governed by a different
rule or principle than damage to personal property." Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774,
793, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 745 (Ex. 1865).
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trialists were often dominant figures in society; country gentlemen were
rarely judges in industrial states. Most of the American judges lacked in-
centive to buck the persistent drift away from liability without fault. Perhaps
this difference in background accounts for the inhospitality to Rylands v.
Fletcher in many states. But such is the power of "authority" that several
states nevertheless embraced the views of Blackburn and Cairns.
The industrialization of both England and America is now an accomplished
fact; forces that moulded Nineteenth Century law are spent or changed.
The current virility of the demand for (and opposition to) enterprise liability
without fault thus requires a different kind of rationale. Scholarly proponents
(whose ideas are reflected in some legislation and an occasional judicial
opinion) applaud liability without fault as a method for imposing losses on
superior risk bearers. Their argument usually runs this way: One who should
know that .his activity, even though carefully prosecuted, may harm others,
should treat this harm as a cost of his activity. If the activity is a business
enterprise, this cost item will influence pricing and will be passed on to
consumers, spread so thin that no one will be seriously affected. If the activity
is not a business enterprise, the actor should not prosecute it for his own
purpose unless he is willing to pay the price. Actors can normally control this
cost item by getting liability insurance, which substitutes a fixed premium for
the 'hazard of ruinous runs of bad luck. The economics of this argument is,
as we shall see, built on dubious assumptions and oversimplifications, but the
theory is a rough approximation of what actually happens in some situations.
Workmen's Compensation Laws, adopted in some form by virtually all state
legislatures, are a good example. The compensation claimant is usually a
poor risk bearer whereas industry generally is able to shift to consumers the
cost of workmen's compensation based on liability without fault.
Thus the avowed goal of the absolute liability approach is allocation of loss
to the party better equipped to pass it on to the public: the superior risk bearer.
At the same time, of course, the total cost of the mishap should be minimized.
Hence, if a defendant's superior risk bearing capacity is a good reason for
shifting a loss to him, a plaintiff's superior risk bearing capacity provides an
even better reason to let the loss lie where it has fallen, for the administrative
and legal expenses of shifting the loss may be saved. The policy, then, should
be one of transferring losses only when necessary to achieve the overriding
goal of proper loss allocation-when, in other words, the shift is from an
inferior to a superior risk bearer. Clearly, the fault principle's disregard for
risk bearing capacity renders it inappropriate for achieving this policy. Yet
in the field of hazardous enterprise, an absolute liability rule would also
defeat this policy if the rule's underlying assumption-that defendant is
always the better risk bearer-were in fact erroneous.
No one has suggested that the courts hear proof in each case on the risk
bearing capacity of the particular litigants. Proof of the affluence or poverty
of litigants is usually excluded as irrelevant and prejudicial (though, of
course, jurors and judges may consciously or unconsciously be influenced by
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their suppositions on these subjects). If such issues were contested, trials
would be long and costly and often beyond the competence of judge and jury.
Moreover, our sense of justice is outraged when claimants are favored merely
because they happen to be poor and defendants are disfavored merely because
they happen to be rich.
We are not so shocked, however, when courts or legislatures deal with the
classes of persons to which individual litigants belong-for example, injured
workmen, landowners who seize cattle damage feasant, blasters, or those
engaged in extra-hazardous businesses. Though liability without fault of
classes of defendants to classes of plaintiffs has drawn criticism, it seldom
evokes widespread indignation.
What classes of litigants are superior or inferior risk bearers? Mr. Enter-
priser is a construction contractor who is readying a bid on a highway
bridge that cannot be feasibly built without blasting near houses and people.
Even if Enterpriser is not liable for blasting damages without proof of fault,
he will be foolish to make his bid without tadng into account the cost of
liability insurance-for if someone is injured the likelihood is fairly high
that Enterpriser or his servants will be proved negligent to a court's satisfac-
tion. And, of course, liability without fault will increase Enterpriser's risk,
forcing him to utilize insurance despite even higher rates. Only financially
irresponsible contractors will venture to disregard this cost and, for a number
of reasons, they are not likely to win the bidding. Since, therefore, the cost
of liability is calculated in fixing Enterpriser's price, Enterpriser is a good
risk bearer.
Enterpriser is the successful bidder. He commences work and blasts care-
fully but nevertheless decimates the nearby chicken flock of Mr. Neighbor.
Since chicken raisers as a class are not likely to be injured by blasting and
Neighbor must meet his competitors' prices, he cannot recoup his losses
by boosting his prices for chickens and eggs. Of course all poultry production
is threatened to some extent by other catastrophic risks such as epidemic
disease, lightning, and tornado. These uncertainties may discourage those who
would otherwise become chicken raisers and thus affect prices slightly, but
when the heavy hand of disaster falls on a chicken farm, the farmer may
well face bankruptcy. Enterpriser is not only a good risk bearer; he is a
better risk bearer than Neighbor.
If Neighbor's injuries were to his body, the conclusion would be much the
same. The financial burden of disabling personal injury overwhelms most
people. While many can bear the cost of minor injury, prolonged infirmity
and extended medical expense often exceed the financial competence of
common men. Unless Neighbor happens to be rich or covered by one of the
more generous workmen's compensation plans, he will probably bear the risk
less easily than Enterpriser. The preponderant likelihood is that Enterpriser
is the better risk bearer of the two.
Supose the harm to Neighbor is damage to his improved urban property-
the roof is knocked off his warehouse. Nearly all city buildings are nuw
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insured against fire, and most policies carry "extended coverage" endorsements
insuring against hazards other than fire, including damage resulting from ex-
plosion. After Neighbor is compensated by his insurance company, it will
be subrogated to his rights; liability without fault will result in a shift of
loss from the fire insurance company to Enterpriser, transferred in turn
to Enterpriser's liability insurer. Although both Neighbor and Enterpriser
are insured, Neighbor is actually the superior risk bearer; property insurance
is a better risk distributing device than liability insurance for two reasons.
First, a property owner can determine how much insurance he needs and
can buy the right amount; a contractor insuring against liability never knows
how much -he may need. If Neighbor owns a $40,000 warehouse, he can come
close to discerning its value and will probably buy $40,000 worth of insurance,
Enterpriser must guess at the damage he may cause. If his guess is too low,
he becomes a self-insurer for damage in excess of his limits and is likely to be
a poor risk bearer for these damages. If his guess is exaggerated, his pricing
will be too high or he will himself bear a wasteful burden.
Secondly, from the claimant's standpoint, property losses are adjusted more
favorably (on the average) than liability losses. Neighbor's fire policy pro-
vides for settlement of claims in various ways. For example, if he and his
insurer disagree on the actual cash value of the property destroyed, the
insurer can rebuild; or if the loss is total and the policy is "valued," liquidated
damages have been set in advance. And Neighbor's insurance company, eager
to hold the good will of its customers, -has special incentives for dealing with
them promptly and justly. But Neighbor is not a customer of Enterpriser's
liability insurer; settlement of a liability claim is much more likely to result iii
dickering, delay, and possibly litigation. This is often true even when a
property insurer is subrogated to a claim and asserts it against a liability
insurer.
In the warehouse case Neighbor is the superior risk bearer. But suppose
that Enterpriser, instead of building a bridge, establishes a nitroglycerin
factory near Neighbor's warehouse. The proximity of this hazard may
make the warehouse uninsurable; no insurance company following sound
underwriting principles would keep such a risk at regular rates, if at all. For
similar reasons Enterpriser will probably have difficulties in securing liability
insurance; but he still has the alternative of setting up reserves, becoming a
self-insurer, and charging this expense to his customers. Neighbor, too, can
become a self-insurer but he will be unable to pass on costs to his customers
and remain a successful competitor. Who would pay more than the usual
storage charges for the doubtful privilege of storing goods next to a nitro-
glycerin plant? Enterpriser is probably the better risk bearer in this case.
Thus far, discussion has centered on hazards that are regularly a part of
Enterpriser's business. But sometimes a justifiably risky activity is sporadic
or occasional and neither affects pricing nor is covered by insurance-a house-
holder undertakes to cut a decayed tree close to a heavily traveled street, a
small resort owner blasts while building a private road, etc. These engagers
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in hazardous activity are not likely to be good risk bearers; they do not
have opportunities to pass their losses on to consumers and probably have
no plans for bearing theni.
Conchsion
The conclusion reached is that those engaged in dangerous activities some-
times are and sometimes are not better risk bearers than those injured by
the prosecution of the activities. The system of analysis used is based on
speculation and assumption, but no more scientific materials are now available
to justify some of the other schemes proposed and actually adopted in this
field. The discussion does justify the conclusion that a general rule of absolute
enterprise liability or liability for hazardous undertakings is bound to saddle
some kind of defendants with losses they can bear no better than the kinds of
plaintiffs compensated. Only courts discriminating wisely among classes of
cases that are now lumped together can evolve a system in which losses are
shifted only from classes of inferior risk bearers to classes of superior risk
bearers. The necessary discriminations collide with some traditional notions
of evenhanded justice, notions which are not likely to fade easily or quickly.
And the function of making these discriminations will not be adequately per-
formed except by a judiciary trained to weigh economic facts and informed
by experts who know much about the economics of accident loss. But perhaps
progress toward a more sensible allocation of accident losses cannot wait for
better knowledge on which to build an ideal system. Possibly an ad hoc
development of enterprise liability can serve us better than either a system
of absolute liability or one in which liability is tied to fault.
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